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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BEATRICE RICE , FRANCES W . 
KENNEDY, RENA B. WHITE, 
GWENDOLYN LANDENBERGER, 
MYN CLEARY, 
Plaintiffs-A ppellants , 
vs . 
ARTHUR MURRAY, INC. , a 
corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Cases No. 14286 
14287 
14288 
14289 
14290 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiffs and appellants herein filed complaints in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County claiming that the defendant and respondent, Arthur 
Murray, I n c . , supervised, directed, and controlled its franchisee in Salt Lake 
City in a course of fraudulent representation and conduct . 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
Each complaint of the appellants asks for compensatory money damages 
as well as punitive damages . The appellants served the complaints, together 
with summonses, upon the respondent at respondent 's office in Dade County, 
Florida. 
Thereafter the respondent filed its motion to quash on the grounds 
that the respondent , Arthur Murray, I n c . , has never done business in the State 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of Utah, nor did it have offices , employees, or agents within the State of Utah 
at any time prior to , during, or s ince the events complained of by the appel lan ts , 
and that , therefore, the respondent would not be subject to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of Utah. 
On July 1 1 , 1975, in the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Stewart M. Hanson, S r . , Judge, quashed the service of summons and dismissed 
appel lan ts ' complaints for lack of jur isdict ion. 
On the 18th of July, 1975, the appellants filed a motion titled "Motion 
to Reopen Judgment for New Evidence to be Introduced and for New Trial"[14290 
R-103-104] . The respondent then filed a motion to strike appel lan ts ' motion 
[14288 R-172-173] on the ground and for the reason that there is no provision 
for a rehearing under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On September 11 , 1975, 
after a second hearing, the District Court of Salt Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, 
S r . , Judge, denied the motion for a new hearing as well as respondent 's motion 
to s t r ike . Thereafter on the 6th of October, 1975, the appellants filed their 
notices of appeal [14290 R-131]. 
The appellants now appeal the order of the trial court quashing the 
service of the summons and the d ismissa l of their complaints for lack of 
jur isdic t ion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellants each began taking dancing lessons during the 1960's 
from a franchisee of the respondent . The franchisee had studios located in 
Salt Lake Ci ty , Utah. During this period of time there was only one franchisee 
operating the dance studio at any given time, but the franchise was sold and 
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passed on to successor franchisees on several occasions during the period of 
time referred to in appel lants ' complaints . 
Under the terms of the franchise agreement [14288 R-54-57] the 
franchisee was operating the dance studio wholly independent of the respondent, 
Arthur Murray, Inc . , as an independent contractor. In the late 1960's , the 
appellants each became disenchanted with the dance lesson program offered by 
the franchisees , and it seemed to each of the appellants that they were not 
receiving the kind of attention to which they had been accustomed to during 
their earlier s tages of the dance lesson program. 
During this period of time the franchise was operated pursuant to a 
franchise contract . Arthur Murray, I n c . , the respondent, by very str ict require-
ments placed in the contract , sought to have the franchisee inform the customers 
of the studio that they were dealing solely with the Salt Lake franchisee and 
not the franchisor, Arthur Murray, Inc . , the respondent herein, since the 
franchisor was not involved in any way with the operation of the studio [14288 
R-54-57, Para. 14] . 
Approximately once a year Arthur Murray, Inc . , the respondent, would 
audit the financial records of its franchisee in Salt Lake City in order to assure 
proper accounting and payment of the franchise obligat ion. The franchisor a l so 
furnished various promotional materials and advertising a s s i s t ance to its fran-
chisee and reauired that certain minimum standards es tabl ished by Arthur Murray, 
Inc . , be met to insure such conduct as would preserve the integrity of the 
Arthur Murray name. Except for these very limited reouirements, the local 
franchisee owned and operated its own franchise studio entirely independent 
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and free of any control from the franchisor, Arthur Murray, Inc . , the respondent . 
The deposition of Paul Curry was taken on May 29, 1975, and this 
shed some light on the day to day operation of the franchisee 's dance studio 
in Salt Lake City. Curry testified that there was very li t t le contact between the 
franchisee and the franchisor during the time period which he managed the 
franchisee studio as long as the franchisee paid the fee as required by the contract 
referred to above . 
Curry further testified that the only employees of Arthur Murray, Inc . , 
the respondent herein, that he observed at the studio while he was the manager 
of the Salt Lake s tudio , were two auditors by the name of Volpe and Imholz. He 
further testified that the manual which was provided by the respondent, Arthur 
Murray, Inc . , was merely a suggest ion as to what course of action to follow. 
He specified that there was no requirement that the provisions of the manual be 
followed explici t ly . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I . 
THE APPEAL OF THE APPELLANTS SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
SINCE IT WAS NOT TIMELY FILED. 
An appeal is permitted from the District Court to the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah. Pursuant to Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the appeal is to be filed within one month from the entry of the judgment of order 
appealed from. The order from which the appellants appeal was entered on 
July 1 1 , 1975, but the notice of appeal was not filed until October 6, 1975, 
which is in excess of the one-month period specified by Rule 73 of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further provides that the 
running of the time for appeal is terminated by a timely motion made pursuant 
to Rule 50(b), Rule 52, or Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. These 
rules provide for a motion to se t as ide a jury verdict (Rule 50), a motion to amend 
findings of fact (Rule 52(b)) and a motion for a new trial (Rule 59). 
Although no motion was filed pursuant to Rule 50(b), Rule 52(b) or 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the appellants did, however, file 
on the 18th of July, 1975, a motion titled "Motion to Reopen Judgment and Decree 
for New Evidence to be Introduced and for a New Trial" [14290 R-103-104]. It 
is the position of the respondent that there is no provision in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure for a rehearing and that a motion for new trial was neither proper 
nor should it be permitted, and that, therefore, for the purposes of appeal , the 
notice of appeal should have been filed within one month of the order of July 11, 
1975. 
This i ssue was raised in Hillman's Equipment, Inc . v . Central Realty, 
Inc . , Ind. App . , 235 N . E . 2d 496 (1968). In the Hillman case a motion for 
summary judgment was granted, and thereafter the appellants filed a motion for 
a new tr ia l , which was overruled by the trial court . The appellants then appealed 
to the Indiana Court of Appeals . The respondent in the Hillman case did not 
quest ion the manner in which the appeal was perfected. However, the Indiana 
Court of Appeals took the position that for purposes of filing a motion for a new 
tr ia l , the hearing for summary judgment was not a trial , and, therefore, the 
motion was neither proper nor permitted. Upon its own motion, the court ruled 
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that the time period within which the notice of appeal was to be filed began to 
run from the date of the entry of the order of summary judgment and not from the 
date that the motion for a new trial was denied. The court in its opinion s ta ted: 
Since a summary judgment is not a tr ial , a motion for a new trial 
is neither proper nor permitted. Meier, e t c . v . Soc . Sec . Adm. 
et a l . (1958), 237 Ind. 421 , 146 N . E. 2d 239; Sacks v . Winkler 
(1967), Ind. App . , 226 N . E . 2d 172. Therefore, compliance 
with the aforementioned Rule requires that the transcript and 
assignment of errors be filed within ninety (90) days from the 
date of the entry of the summary judgment by the trial court, 
and not from the date of the court 's ruling on the motion for a 
new t r ia l . 
In the case a t bar appellant did not file its appeal within ninety 
days from the entry of summary judgment, therefore requiring 
that this appeal be d i smissed . 235 N .E . 2d at 497 . 
The Utah Supreme Court has a lso addressed itself to the issue as to 
whether or not a motion to reconsider is proper under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In Drury v . Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P. 2d 662 (1966), the court 
indicated that once a trial court has made a ruling upon a motion it may not 
reconsider its own judgment and the order it has entered. In the Drury case the 
trial court sit t ing without a jury entered judgment and then granted a motion for 
a new tr ia l . The trial court then reconsidered the motion for a new trial and then 
reversed itself, letting the original judgment stand and no new trial was then 
granted. The Utah Supreme Court held that once the trial court had ruled upon 
a motion, both the duty and prerogative of the court were at an end. The case 
was then remanded to the trial court for a new trial in accordance with the original 
order which granted a new t r ia l . 
In making this ruling the Utah Supreme Court s ta ted the rationale behind 
the rule that a trial court cannot reconsider or rehear a motion once the order has 
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been entered. The Supreme Court s tated as follows: 
When this has been done and the court has ruled upon the 
motion, if the party ruled against were permitted to go beyond 
the ru le s , make a motion for reconsiderat ion, and persuade 
the judge to reverse himself, the question a r i s e s , why should 
not the other party who is now ruled against be permitted to 
make a motion for re^re-considerat ion, asking the court to 
again reverse himself? Tenacious li t igants and lawyers might 
persist in motions, arguments and pressures and theorectically 
a judge could go on reversing himself periodically at the 
entreaties of one or the other of the parties ad infinitum. 
This reflection brings one to real ize what an unsatisfactory 
situation would exis t if a judge could carry in his mind 
indefinitely a s ta te of uncertainty as to what the final 
resolution of the matter should b e . 18 Utah 2d at 76. 
It is submitted that the proper procedure for the appellants to have 
followed after the motion to quash was granted would be for them to have filed 
an appeal to this court rather than to file a motion which is neither proper nor 
permitted. Since the motion was not proper nor permitted, it did not terminate 
the running of the time for appea l , and that , therefore, the appeal was not timely 
fi led. 
In a later c a s e , Utah State Employees Credit Union v . Riding, 24 Utah 2d 
211 , 469 P. 2d 1 (1970), the Utah Supreme Court s ta ted: 
We think the motion to reconsider the motion to vacate the 
judgment is abortive under the ru l e s . . . . 24 Utah 2d at 214. 
The Utah cases seem to be in accord with the general ru le . 58 Am. Jur. 
2d, New Trial, Section 22, the rule is s tated as follows: 
From the very fact that the remedy bears the name "new trial , " 
one assumes that there must have been a trial; and at this 
point the question ar ises , how much of a "trial" must there 
be in order to support a motion or petition for a new one? 
Where an action was disposed of upon a motion for summary 
judgment, wherein the court sustained the motion and 
entered judgment without a trial of i s sues of fact, a motion 
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for new trial is not appropriate and is not permitted. Like-
w i s e , where a judgment of d ismissal is entered without a trial 
of an i ssue of fact , a motion for new trial cannot be filed. 
Thus, where the trial court d ismisses the action because it 
has no jurisdict ion, it cannot entertain a motion for new tr ia l . 
58 Am. Jur. 2d a t 206. 
If the motion to reconsider is abort ive, or in the a l ternat ive , if a 
motion for a new trial is neither proper nor permitted, the time within which an 
appeal must be filed was not terminated. Therefore, it is submitted that this 
court should do as the court in the Hillman case did; dismiss the appeal of the 
appellants s ince the appeal was not timely filed and this court would be wi th-
out jur isdic t ion. 
POINT II . 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN QUASHING THE SERVICE 
OF THE SUMMONSES AND DISMISSING THE APPELLANTS' 
COMPLAINTS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION SINCE THE ACTIVITIES 
OF THE RESPONDENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE THE MINIMUM 
CONTACTS TO GIVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE 
RESPONDENT. 
The appellants claim that the courts of Utah have jurisdiction over 
the respondent pursuant to 78-27-22 U . C . A . (1953) as amended. This s tatute 
is commonly referred to as the "Long Arm Sta tu te" . The statute provides as 
follows: 
Any person,not withstanding sect ion 16-10-102, whether or 
not a resident of this s t a t e , who in person or through an 
agent does any of the following enumerated a c t s , submits 
himself, and if an individual, his personal representa t ive , 
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this s ta te as to any claim 
arising from: 
(1) The transaction of any business within this s ta te ; 
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this s ta te ; 
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(3) The causing of any injury within this s ta te whether 
tortious or by breach of warranty; 
Although this s tatute was enacted in 1969, the theory that the courts 
of any of the several s ta tes of the United States may have jurisdiction over non-
residents who have minimal contacts or minimum contacts with the s ta te which 
a s se r t s its jurisdiction is not new to this court . 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for service of 
process upon foreign corporations doing business in the State of Utah. In 
d iscuss ing whether or not a particular s ta te has jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation, the terms of "doing b u s i n e s s , " "minimal c o n t a c t s , " and "minimum 
contact , " are often used and it would appear that any distinction between these 
phrases is mere semantics as pointed out by this court in Hill v . Zale Corporation, 
25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P. 2d 332 (1971) and Foreign Study League v . Holland-
America Line, 27 Utah 2d 442, 497 P. 2d 244 (1972) . 
Within just a few years after the United States Supreme Court handed 
down its decis ion in International Shoe Company v . State of Washington, 326 U . S . 
310, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945), the Utah Supreme Court addressed itself to the i ssue 
as to whether or not a corporation was doing business within the State of Utah, 
and, therefore, pursuant to the rule announced in International Shoe subject to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of Utah. See Western Gas Appliances v . Servel, I n c . , 
123 Utah 229, 257 P. 2d 950 (1953). In the Western Gas Appliances c a s e , the 
defendant Servel entered into an agreement with local dealers to promote the 
sa les and servicing of Servel products in this s t a t e . Except for one isolated 
occas ion , Servel , the defendant, sold no products directly to any person within 
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the s t a t e , but on the contrary dealt directly with its distributors . 
A lawsuit arose when the defendant cancelled its franchise with the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County. Service was obtained pursuant to Rule 4(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides: 
If no officer or agent [of the corporation] can be found in the 
s t a t e , and the defendant does business in this s t a t e , then 
upon the person doing such business . 
The trial court granted Servel fs motion to dismiss for lack of ju r i s -
dict ion, and the plaintiff appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. 
In its opinion, the court reviewed the fac t s , although the court did 
point out that where i ssues of fact are involved and there are no findings of 
fact , the appellate court would not review the facts and would affirm the 
decis ion if from the evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support 
the trial court 's dec is ion . 
The court went on to discuss the cases of Industrial Commission v . 
Kemmerer Coal Co . , 106 Utah 476, 150 P. 2d 373 (1944), and Wabash R. Co . v . 
District Court of Third Judicial Dis t . in and for Salt Lake County, 109 Utah 526, 
167 P. 2d 973 (1946), wherein the court had held that a foreign corporation was 
doing business within the s ta te and w a s , therefore, subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Utah courts . 
The court then ruled, affirming the decision of the trial court, that 
Servel was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts and in so ruling the 
court s ta ted : 
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Thus before defendant 's acts could properly be classif ied 
as doing business within the State , it would have to be 
shown that there was some degree of continuity or regular-
ity of such a c t s , coupled with some manner of entering 
into direct business transactions with o thers . If such 
circumstances did ex i s t , the acts of defendant herein 
shown might properly be considered in augmentation 
of other proof as to doing business . 
'k'k'k'k-k'k'k'k'k'k 
In this context , as noted in International Shoe Co . v . 
State of Washington, the term "presence" is "used merely 
to symbolize those act ivi t ies of the corporation's agent 
within the s ta te which courts will deem to be sufficient 
to satisfy the demands of due p r o c e s s . " 257 P. 2d at 953. 
Whether the act ivi t ies of a corporation within a certain s ta te are 
cas t in terms of "presence" , "minimum con tac t s " , "minimal con tac t s " , or 
"doing b u s i n e s s , " the theory is st i l l the same; the foreign corporation must 
have sufficient contacts to satisfy the demands of due process before it is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of that s t a t e . The enactment of the 
"Utah Long Arm Statute" is merely a codification of this ru le . 
The appellants have cited Caeser ' s World, Inc . v . Spencer Foods, I n c . , 
498 F. 2d 1176 (8th Cir . , 1974). This case involved a contract dispute between 
a franchisee and a franchisor, a foreign corporation allegedly doing business 
in the State of Iowa. The action was brought in the United States District 
Court; however, the Question of jurisdiction under the Iowa Long Arm Statute 
a r o s e . The United States District Court held that it did have jurisdiction and 
this was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals . In reviewing the 
question as to whether or not the application of the Long Arm Statute consti tuted 
a denial of due process , the Circuit Court of Appeals se t forth the five factors 
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which it considered to be determinative of whether or not personal jurisdiction 
could be exerc i sed . These guidelines were as follows: 
(1) the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum s ta te ; 
(2) the Quantity of contacts with the forum s ta te ; (3) the 
relation of the cause of action to the contac ts ; (4) the interest 
of the forum s ta te in providing a forum for its res idents ; and 
(5) the convenience of the par t i es . 498 F. 2d at 1180. 
This c a s e , although it does involve a dispute concerning a franchise 
agreement, is dis t inguishable from the facts of the case now before the court. 
In Caeser ! s World, the dispute was between the franchisee, a resident 
of the State of Iowa, and the franchisor, a foreign corporation. An analogous 
si tuat ion would be presented in the case now before the court if the franchisees 
of the respondent were to bring an action against the respondent; however, this , 
of course , is not the case nor the facts now before the court . 
As s tated by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Caese r ' s World, there 
must be some relat ionship between the contacts referred to and the cause of 
ac t ion . The only contacts which are reflected in the record include the 
respondent 's entry into a contract with the franchisee, the isolated and sporadic 
auditing of the financial records of the franchisee, and the sending of various 
pieces of literature to the State of Utah to a s s i s t the franchisee in the s u c c e s s -
ful operation of the franchisee 's b u s i n e s s . 
Since the enactment of the Utah Long Arm Statute , this court has 
ruled on several occas ions on the i ssue of whether or not a defendant is s ub -
jec t to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts by virtue of doing any of the acts or 
engaging in any of the conduct enumerated in the "Long Arm S ta tu t e . " The 
case of Hill v . Zale Corporation, Supra, is probably the leading Utah case in 
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this area of the law. 
In Hill v . Zale , the Utah Supreme Court, much as the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals did in Caeser f s World, laid down certain guidelines to be used 
in applying such abstract terms as "doing business , " "minimal contac ts , " 
"minimum c o n t a c t s , " and "p resence . " The oft-quoted guidelines as laid down 
in the Hill v . Zale case are as follows: 
(1) Whether there are local offices, s to re s , or out le ts ; 
(2) The presence of personnel, how hired, fired and paid; the 
degree of control and the nature of their dut ies ; 
(3) The manner of holding out to the public by way of adver-
t i s ing, telephone l i s t ings , ca t a logs , e t c . ; 
(4) The presence of its property, real or personal , or interest 
therein, including inventories , bank accounts , e t c . ; 
(5) Whether the act ivi t ies are sporadic or transitory as 
compared to continuous and systematic ; 
(6) The extent to which the alleged facts of the asser ted 
claim arose from act ivi t ies within the s ta te ; 
(7) The relative hardship or convenience to the parties in 
being required to l i t igate the controversy in the s ta te or 
e l sewhere . 25 Utah 2d at 360. 
In reviewing the evidence in the record and applying the guidelines 
of Hill v . Zale , it is submitted that the activi ty and conduct of the respondent 
does not measure up to the guidelines which were se t down to insure that due 
process and substant ial fair play are adhered to . We will now review the record 
applying the facts to each of the guidelines as se t down in Hill v . Zale . 
(1) Whether there are local offices, s to re s , or ou t le t s . The appellants 
do not contend that the respondent maintained local offices, s to res , or ou t le t s , 
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and, in fact , there were no local offices, s to re s , or outlets in the State of 
Utah which were operated by the respondent , Arthur Murray, Inc . 
(2) The presence of personnel , how hired, fired and paid; the degree 
of control and the nature of their du t i e s . The record will reflect that although 
there is a dispute concerning the s tatus of certain dance inst ructors , including 
Nina Sananiego and Vicki Venka Sevic, the deposition of Paul Curry reveals 
that these instructors or judges were hired on an individual bas i s as independent 
contractors by the local franchisee in Salt Lake City without any supervision 
or control of the respondent . Mr. Curry in his deposit ion testified concerning 
Sananiego !s relat ionship with the local studio and the respondent . He testified 
concerning this relat ionship as follows: 
Q . Now, when Nina Sananiego came up here to Salt Lake 
to judge a s tudent , who would pay her expenses from 
Southern California? 
A. The individual s tudio . In other words , Salt Lake City 
would pay her flight, room and board, and food, plus 
sa la ry . 
Q . Do you know if Arthur Murray, Inc . , ever paid Nina 
Sananiego for any of her vis i ts to Salt Lake when she 
came to judge s tudents? 
A. The home office never paid the expense of that 
individual judge . * v v:: 
Q . It was always the individual s tudio , is that r ight? 
A. Yes . 
[Curry Deposition, 49:9-49:21] 
* * * 
Q . How would you arrange for either Venka or Sananiego 
or any of these judges to come to Salt Lake? 
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A. Usually a lot of times , we would either write a letter 
to them or call them or we might see them at a Dance-
O-Rama or convention because many times if we were 
going to have our Medal Ball, for example, le t ' s say 
for the end of the year , it might be May that I happen 
to see them at a Dance-O-Rama and so I would check 
then to see if they were free at that time to make 
arrangements then. 
Q , Would you clear this with Arthur Murray, Inc? 
A. No, I didn't have to because they were a qualified 
person of the board. 
[Curry Deposition, 50:25, 51:1-51:11] 
The only employees of the respondent who entered the State of Utah 
were the auditors who visi ted sometimes as infrequently as every two y e a r s . 
They came to audit the financial records of the franchisee to make sure that an 
accurate accounting was being made pursuant to the franchise contract . Curry 
testified concerning these vis i t s of the auditors as follows: 
Q . What I'm asking you is if any of these Arthur Murray 
employees ever came to the studio in the years 1963 
through 1969, and if s o , what were those employees ' 
names? I'm talking about Arthur Murray, Incorporated. 
A. Imholz is the only one I remember. 
0 • How about Volpe, or whatever his name is ? 
A. And Volpe. Those are the only two. 
Q . These were both auditors ? 
A. Yes . 
Q . Who came about once a year? 
A. Yes . 
Q . This would vary then, wouldn't i t ? 
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A. Yes . It varied a lot of times , but we know that it 
would be no longer than two yea r s , usual ly about a 
year or we knew at any time he was going to be 
dropping in . 
-
;
 [Curry Deposition, 60:19-61:9] 
The testimony of Mr. Curry substant ia tes the answer given to the 
appel lants 1 interrogatories wherein Arthur Murray, I n c . , the respondent , s ta ted 
that the only employees of the respondent who vis i ted the State of Utah were 
Mr. Frank J. Imholz, Samuel Gant, and Wayne Smith [14290 R-41-52] . The 
purpose of their v is i t s was solely to ascer ta in if the franchisee, the dance studio 
owner, was in substant ial compliance with the terms of the franchise agreement. 
The appellants have referred to the Arthur Murray manual and claim 
that this manual was controlling upon the f ranchisees . The deposit ion of 
Mr. Curry would indicate to the contrary. Curry testified concerning this 
manual from his experience as a manager of the franchise studio during a 
portion of the time referred to in plaintiffs1 complaint . Concerning this manual, 
Mr. Curry testif ied: 
Q . Now, I take it you are required to follow this manual? 
A. Wel l , I wouldn' t say required but it was used as the 
purposes of good guidance for u s , for many times you 
might have people who were inexperienced in the 
managerial line so it was a good guide for them. 
Q . So if you didn' t follow i t , you would be checked or 
something? 
A. It probably would be kind of ignorant on the individual 's 
part because this is knowledge from experienced people 
who had been in bus iness for a long t ime. 
Q . Would it be fair to say that under the franchise you 
were supposed to use this manual? 
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A. You were advised to follow up but again there was 
not a s t r ic t rule put on i t . It was just an aim for 
al l studios to follow. 
[Curry Deposit ion, 11:10-11:25] 
In reviewing the manual, it will be seen that the material contained 
therein is merely general in nature and is nothing more than a series of 
suggestions to aid a franchisee in the successful operation of his s tudio . 
This manual was merely an aid to each individual studio and nothing more. 
In addit ion, the appellants claim that there were certain promotional 
act ivi t ies suggested by the franchisor, Arthur Murray, Inc . , the respondent, 
but here again there was no str ict requirement concerning the operation of the 
program. In answer to questions put to him by appel lants ' counsel concerning 
the promotional programs, Curry s ta ted: 
, Q . And they told you the prices to charge; did they not 
on these drives ? 
A. No, because we had se t prices . In other words we 
were charging a t that time, if I remember right, around 
eighteen or nineteen dollars an hour and that was 
s tandard. There was nothing saying that we alternate 
the pr ice . 
Q . Now, let me say th is : Did you have these drives 
where you gave special rates of, say , thirty dollars 
for ten lessons or fifteen dollars for ten lessons — 
did you have— 
A. Yes , we had various inducements . 
Q . Yes , inducement dr ives , that 's what I'm speaking about. 
A. Yes . 
Q . They were se t up by Arthur Murray? 
A. Or the individual studios could a l s o . 
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Q . But they were se t up is what Ifm talking about? 
A. Wel l , s e e , they didn' t operate the whole thing, they 
would suggest very good successful things to us and 
we could use whichever ones we wanted . 
Q . Wel l , didn' t you follow those? 
A. Oh, y e s , because they were very successful o n e s . 
[Curry Deposit ion, 15:3-15:25] ^ 
As can be seen from the testimony of Mr. Curry, Arthur Murray, Inc . , 
the respondent , only suggested successful programs. The studio in Salt Lake 
City se t its own prices and hired its own personnel without supervision of the 
respondent . The only two employees of Arthur Murray, Inc . , the respondent , 
that Mr. Curry ever recal led seeing in Salt Lake City were the audi tors . The 
respondent ' s sole contact with the State of Utah was merely to v is i t the s ta te 
sporadically to insure that payments were being made properly pursuant to the 
franchise agreement and to mail literature to the franchise studio suggesting 
successful ways to operate the s tudio . 
Concerning the question of how much contact the respondent , Arthur 
Murray, I n c . , had with the franchisee studio and the State of Utah, Mr. Curry 
summed it a l l up very well when he s ta ted: 
A. While I was there we had very l i t t le because we were 
always current on our franchise fee, and that ' s probably 
nine-tenths of it right there . 
[Curry Deposition, 61:221 
The testimony of Mr. Curry which sheds some light on the day to day 
act ivi t ies of the franchisee would indicate that the presence of the respondent 's 
personnel was only on a sporadic bas i s and seems to imply that the v is i t s were 
- 1 8 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
more in the nature of "spot checks" on the franchisee 's records . The dance 
instructors obviously were not employees of the respondent since Curry would 
not check with the respondent prior to making arrangements to have the dance 
instructors come to the s tudio . The individual studios paid all of the expenses 
and the wages of the individual instructors . Clearly this would not consti tute 
a minimal contact as required. 
(3) The manner of holding out to the public by way of advert is ing, 
telephone l i s t ings , ca ta logs , e t c . The franchise agreement between the franchisee 
and the respondent [14288 R-54-57, Para. 14] provides as follows: 
(a) The franchisee will include provision in each enrollment 
agreement or contract entered into with a student relating to 
the taking of dancing lessons or the payment therefor sub -
stant ia l ly as follows: This agreement is made by student with 
the franchised owner of the studio in which he or she is en-
rolling and said franchisee is solely responsible for the 
performance of this contract and the dancing lessons provided 
for herein. As s tudent , I understand and agree that this 
contract is made by me solely with the above s tudio, as 
sel ler and does not directly or indirectly consti tute an 
agreement with or an obligation of Arthur Murray, Inc . , or 
any of i ts employees . 
(b) In each extension and renewal agreement or contract 
entered into with a s tudent , the franchisee in addition to the 
above provision will include a provision substant ial ly as 
follows: This agreement may be cancelled with or without 
cause at any time up to and including one week after the 
completion of the units of dancing instruction previously 
contracted for by student with s tudio , if any, without cos t 
or obligation except that a charge may be made for not in 
excess of two additional lessons furnished during each week 
pursuant thereto. 
(c) Franchisee agrees to use at all times the words "a fran-
chised s tudio" whenever "Arthur Murray Studio, " "Arthur 
Murray Dance S tudio ," "Arthur Murray School of Dancing, " 
or any variation thereof is used in the franchisee 's adver-
tising or printed matter. The franchisee agrees to use in 
- 1 9 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
his appointment ca rds , r ece ip t s , e t c . , wherever the name 
"Arthur Murray" appears , the phrase "Arthur Murray Dance 
S tud io , " , "franchisee, " (the blank 
to be filled in with the franchisee 's name). 
(d) The franchisee will immediately have the phrase "Arthur 
Murray Dance Studio" 'bwner and 
franchisee" (the blank to be filled in with the franchisee 's 
name) painted on the outer door of entrance to the fran-
ch i see ' s studio or s tud ios . 
In reviewing this paragraph, it is apparent that the respondent was 
taking the necessary s teps to make sure that the franchisee would advise its 
customers that the customer was dealing with the franchisee and not with the 
respondent . This information was to be contained in all of the cont rac t s , and 
in addit ion, this information was to be contained in all advertising or other 
printed matter. 
(4) The presence of its property, real or personal , or interest therein, 
including inventor ies , bank accounts , e t c . The appellants do not contend nor 
is there any evidence in the record which would suggest that the respondent is 
the owner of any real or personal property in the State of Utah. 
(5) Whether the act ivi t ies are sporadic or transitory as compared to 
continuous and sys temat ic . We believe the question as to whether or not the 
act ivi t ies of the respondent are either sporadic or continuous is bes t answered 
by Mr. Curry when he testified that he never had much contact with the repre-
senta t ives of the respondent as long as the franchise fees were current. He 
testified that no real schedule was followed and sometimes as much as two years 
passed between v i s i t s . Other than the vis i t s of the audi tors , the only other 
contact that Arthur Murray, I n c . , the respondent herein, had with the State of 
Utah was to send to the franchisee in the State of Utah certain literature to aid 
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in the successful operation of the franchise s tudio . 
(6) The extent to which the alleged facts of the asser ted claim arose 
from act ivi t ies within the s t a t e . In reviewing the record and the evidence 
contained therein, it would appear that the act ivi t ies of the respondent, Arthur 
Murray, I n c . , were confined to sending literature into the s ta te to a s s i s t the 
franchisee, entering into the franchise contract , and periodic audits of the 
franchisee 's financial records . The appellants al lege fraud on the part of 
the respondent; however, the claim of fraud apparently does not arise out of any 
of the very limited act ivi t ies entered into by the respondent. The extent to which 
the al leged facts of the asser ted claim arose from the act ivi t ies within the s ta te 
is one of the criteria laid down by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Caese r ' s 
World. 
In Mack Financial Corporation v . Nevada Motor Rentals, I n c . , 14 Utah 
2d 276, 529 P. 2d 429 (1974), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the defendant 
was not doing business within the State of Utah, and, therefore, not subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Utah cour t s . In that c a s e , the defendant, a foreign 
corporation, entered into a sa les contract to purchase vehicles from the plaintiff. 
The sa les were made in Denver, Colorado, and a subsequent assignment of the 
contract was made to another foreign corporation in the State of Idaho. The Utah 
Supreme Court concluded that although the trucks were driven over the highways 
of Utah, this did not consti tute doing business within the State of Utah. 
Apparently there was not a sufficient connection between the claim asser ted by 
the plaintiff, namely the breach of the contract , and the fact that the trucks 
were used in the State of Utah. In the case now before the court it is submitted 
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that the claim asser ted by the appellants is not sufficiently connected with 
those very minimal contacts which the respondent has with the State of Utah. 
The contacts with the State of Utah involve giving some a s s i s t ance to the 
franchisee and making sure that the franchisee makes the payment as required 
by the contract . This is not connected sufficiently with the al legations of 
fraud. 
(7) The relative hardship or convenience to the parties in being 
required to l i t igate the controversy in the s ta te or e l sewhere . It is conceded 
that a possible hardship might ar ise if the appellants are required to l i t igate this 
matter in the State of Florida; however, it would a l so const i tute a hardship upon 
the respondent to l i t igate this claim in the State of Utah due to the fact that all I 
of the records and al l of the employees of the respondent which visi ted the State 
of Utah are residents of the State of Florida. All of the records would have to 
be transported, together with the personnel, from the State of Florida to testify 
concerning this lawsui t . It would appear that the arguments on each side of this 
i s sue are evenly balanced; however, one must real ize that the appellants apparently 
overlooked the fact that if they were defrauded, they were defrauded by the f ranchisees , 
all of whom at one time or another were residents of the State of Utah. For reasons 
bes t known to the appe l l an t s , they have decided not to file an action against these 
local f ranchisees . Although the merits of the complaint are not before the court, 
it would appear that if there is a cause of action agains t the respondent, there 
would a l so be a cause of action against the local f ranchisees . Instead of filing 
a lawsuit agains t the local franchisees , the appellants have decided to bring 
an action agains t the franchisor, Arthur Murray, I n c . , who is the respondent . 
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The respondent, Arthur Murray, I n c . , is a corporation which had very limited 
contacts with the local franchise studio and is very distant from this forum. 
In weighing the hardships on the l i t igants , it would be much less of 
a hardship for the appellants to e lect to either sue the respondent in the State of 
Florida, or in the a l ternat ive , bring an action directly against the franchisees 
in the State of Utah than it would be to have a foreign corporation with its 
offices in the State of Florida subjected to litigation in the State of Utah when 
its connection with the State of Utah is of a very limited nature. It is submitted 
that when the criteria of Hill v . Zale are applied to the facts contained in the 
record, there is no question but that the facts do not measure up to those 
criteria which could be used to insure that when jurisdiction is asser ted over a 
foreign person or corporation, the traditional notions of fair play,substantial 
j u s t i ce , and due process are not offended. 
POINT HI. 
THE RECORD AND EVIDENCE CONTAINED THEREIN SHOULD 
BE VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE RESPONDENT 
AND THE JUDGMENT OF LOWER COURT. 
The appellants in their brief have summarized certain facts while 
overlooking those facts presented to the trial court which support the trial court 's 
finding that the respondent was not doing bus iness in the State of Utah, and, 
therefore, not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this S ta te . The 
appellants now claim that any inference that can be drawn from the complaints 
and the record in general should be drawn in a manner which would favor the 
appe l l an t s . 
The appellants refer only to those portions of the Curry deposition which 
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support their position that the respondent was doing bus iness in the State of 
Utah. They a l so make use of the affidavit of Marie LaTour and certain other 
documents contained in the record; however, they totally ignore those portions 
of the record which support the trial court 's findings . They make no mention of 
those portions of the Curry deposition which would indicate that the only 
representat ives of the respondent who visi ted the State of Utah were the audi tors , 
and that these auditors only vis i ted on certain isolated ins tances to determine 
whether the franchisee was making a fair and accurate accounting. The appellants 
have seized upon certain portions of the record and now ask this court to over-
turn the decision of the trial court based on part of the record and ask this court 
to totally ignore certain other portions of the record. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held in Dunham-Bush, Inc . v.Bill Hartmann 
Plumbing & Heating, I n c . , 30 Utah 2d 177, 515 P. 2d 92 (1973), that the deter-
mination of the question as to whether or not a corporation is doing business 
within the s ta te is dependent upon a determination made on matters of fact . 
The court in its decision in that case s tated as follows: 
Resolution of the question of whether a foreign corporation 
is doing bus iness within a s ta te is dependent upon the 
determination made on matters of fact , and the traditional 
rules of review as to the trial court 's prerogatives, and 
the presumptions of veri ty, are appl icable . 515 P. 2d at 94. 
The traditional rules of review which the court referred to above include 
the rule that the appellate court should review evidence in the light most favor-
able to the party whose motion for judgment was granted. See Parrish v . Tahtaras , 
7 Utah 2d 87, 318 P. 2d 642 (1957). See a l so Charlton v . Hackett , 11 Utah 2d 
389, 360 P. 2d 176 (1961). 
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In the Charlton case referred to above, the trial court sitting without 
a jury rendered a judgment for the buyer of securi t ies . The securi t ies broker 
appealed, and in sustaining the trial court 's decis ion, the Utah Supreme Court 
s ta ted as follows: 
In considering the at tack on the findings and judgment of 
of the trial court it is our duty to follow these cardinal 
rules of review: to indulge them a presumption of validity 
and correctness ; to require the appellant to sus ta in the 
burden of showing error; to review the record in the light 
most favorable to them; and not to disturb them if they 
find substant ial support in the evidence . 11 Utah 2d at 390. 
It is submitted that to overturn the decision of the trial court, the 
appellants have the burden of showing error, and this would include a showing 
that the trial court 's decision does not find substant ial support in the evidence 
presented. To do this the court would have to totally ignore the testimony of 
Mr. Paul Curry wherein he testified concerning the nature of the arrangement 
with the dance instructors who are not employees or representat ives of the 
appel lant , but were hired on an individual bas is by the local franchisee. In 
addit ion, the court would have to look at only one portion of the Curry deposition 
concerning the manual referred to and totally ignore the testimony of Mr. Curry 
wherein he s ta ted that it was just a good guide for a franchisee to follow, and in 
his words , "suggest ions" as to how a successful franchisee operation should 
be operated. 
In reviewing the Curry deposit ion, it can be seen that the trial court 
had sufficient evidence to conclude that the only contact the respondent had 
with the State of Utah and its franchisee was merely to verify that the franchisee 
was making an accurate and fair accounting pursuant to the franchise agreement 
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and to a s s i s t the franchisee by forwarding certain literature to him. As Curry 
s t a t ed , if the franchisee was current in making his payment under the contract , 
the v is i t s of the auditor were very sporadic and sometimes the vis i t s were as 
much as two years apar t . 
In reviewing the record on appea l , it must be admitted that there may 
be a dispute in the evidence presented to the trial court; however, as indicated 
above, this court should review the record in the light most favorable to the 
respondent . In the case of Dansak v . Deluke, 12 Utah 2d 302, 366 P. 2d 67 (1961), 
the Utah Supreme Court conceded there was what it cal led a sharp dispute in the 
ev idence . The appellants in that case asked the court to review the evidence 
received by the trial court si t t ing without a jury. The court extensively reviewed 
the evidence surrounding the transaction in dispute and then in affirming the 
trial court 's decis ion , s ta ted as follows: 
While Lucy testified as to the agreement, and inferences 
can be drawn from the circumstances surrounding the 
formation of the corporation, nevertheless the trial judge 
saw fit to believe the testimony of the plaintiffs and 
disbel ieve that of Lucy. This being a ca se at law it 
follows that this appeal is upon questions of law a lone . 
This court cannot pass upon the weight of the evidence, 
nor determine conflicts therein, but can only determine 
whether or not the findings and judgment of the trial 
court find substant ia l support in the ev idence . In so 
examining the evidence , all reasonable presumptions 
are in favor of such findings and judgment, and the 
evidence must be considered in the light most favorable 
to them. 12 Utah 2d at 306. 
In summary, it is the position of the respondent that the record and 
the evidence contained therein adequately support the decision of the trial court 
and that this court should not se ize upon certain portions of the record and over-
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turn the decision of the trial court when other portions of the record support 
the trial court 's decision that the respondent was not doing business within 
the State of Utah, and, therefore, not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts 
of this s t a t e . 
CONCLUSIONS 
The respondent respectfully submits that the appeal of the appellants 
should be dismissed since it was not timely filed pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. In the event that this court rules that the motion to reconsider 
was sufficient to terminate the running of the time within which an appeal must 
be filed, then it is further submitted that the trial court did not err in ruling as 
it did since the record adequately supports the trial court 's decis ion. 
The judgment in favor of the defendant-respondent, Arthur Murray, I n c . , 
should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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